

Message Text

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2468

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 0067

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AND THE U.S. DRAFT TEXT
OF MARCH 5, 1975 (SALT TWO - 547)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AND THE U.S. DRAFT TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PRESENTED AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF
MARCH 5, 1975.

QUOTE

MR. MINISTER:

I

AS I NOTED YESTERDAY, OUR TWO DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN ENGAGED
IN RECENT WEEKS IN A USEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
CONCERNING THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS. AS A RESULT OF THESE EXCHANGES, WE HAVE DEVELOPED
A CLEARER CONCEPTION OF THE TASK THAT LIES BEFORE US. WE HAVE
MOVED CLOSER TO DEFINING THOSE SUBJECTS ON WHICH THERE APPEARS

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TO BE A SIMILARITY IN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO DELEGATIONS. WE

HAVE ALSO CLARIFIED THOSE SUBJECTS ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN REACHED.

THE GOAL OF OUR WORK HERE IS TO EXPAND THE AREA OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS. TO ACHIEVE THIS AIM, WE MUST CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON REDUCING THE AREA OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR POSITIONS. WE MUST TOGETHER ACTIVELY SEARCH FOR WAYS TO OVERCOME THESE DIFFERENCES. IN SO DOING, WE MUST AVOID SEEKING FORMULAS THAT MAY GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF AGREEMENT, BUT IN REALITY LEAVE UNRESOLVED AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT.

AN AGREEMENT THAT LIMITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS NEEDS TO BE CLEARLY DRAWN IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON THE PART OF EITHER SIDE THAT COULD THREATEN THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT. ITS PROVISIONS SHOULD BE CLEAR, PRECISE, AND EXPLICIT TO ENSURE AGAINST ANY AMBIGUITIES CONCERNING THE OBLIGATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ASSUMED.

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT THE US DELEGATION IS TODAY SETTING FORTH IN A MORE PRECISE FORM THE VIEWS WHICH IT HAS BEEN ADVANCING. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT IN FORMULATING THESE VIEWS WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE PROPOSALS SET FORTH BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND THE EXPOSITIONS PRESENTED IN SUPPORT OF THEM. WE BELIEVE THAT BY PRESENTING OUR CONCRETE PROPOSALS WE WILL ASSIST THE CONTINUING EFFORTS OF BOTH DELEGATIONS TO EXPLORE, INTENSIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY, THOSE SUBJECTS ON WHICH WE STILL LACK AGREEMENT.

MR. MINISTER, ON INSTRUCTIONS OF MY GOVERNMENT, I WILL PRESENT THE DRAFT TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. I WILL READ IT TO YOU NOW.

II

TEXT OF DRAFT AGREEMENT

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE PARTIES,

CONSCIOUS THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD HAVE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL MANKIND,

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DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS BEGUN WITH THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (INTERIM AGREEMENT), BOTH OF WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE ON OCTOBER 3, 1972,

PROCEEDING FROM THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
OF
MAY 29, 1972,

RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE TO EACH PARTY OF A STABLE STRATEGIC
RELATIONSHIP BASED ON EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY,

MINDFUL OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

CONVINCED THAT THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN THIS
AGREEMENT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIO
S
FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING AND REDUCING STRATEGIC
ARMS AS WELL AS TO THE RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE
STRENGTHENING OF TRUST BETWEEN STATES,

CONVINCED THAT FURTHER MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN LEADING TO A DECREASE IN THE
RISK OF OUTBREAK OF WAR INVOLVING NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

DECLARING THEIR INTENTION TO UNDERTAKE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS TO
REDUCE AND FURTHER LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE I

EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND
TO ADOPT OTHER MEASURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS
AGREEMENT.

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ARTICLE II

FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS AGREEMENT:

1. AN INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM) IS ANY LAND-
BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABLE OF RANGES IN EXCESS OF 5,500
KILOMETERS.

2. A SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE (SLBM) IS A BALLISTIC
MISSILE INSTALLED ON A NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINE OR A BALLISTIC MISSLE

FIRST FLIGHT-TESTED SINCE 1965 AND INSTALLED ON ANY SUBMARINE REGARD-
LESS OF TYPE.

3. HEAVY BOMBERS CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF AIRCRAFT HOWEVER CONFIGURED: CURRENTLY FOR THE UNITED STATES, B-52 AND B-1 AIRCRAFT; AND CURRENTLY FOR THE SOVIET UNION, TUPOLEV (BEAR) MYASISHCHEV (BISON) AND TUPOLEV VARIABLE-GEOMETRY WING (BACKFIRE) AIRCRAFT. TYPES OF AIRCRAFT TO BE INCLUDED AS HEAVY BOMBERS IN THE FUTURE SHALL INCLUDE AIRCRAFT WITH CAPABILITIES COMPARABLE OR SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF THE TYPES OF AIRCRAFT LISTED ABOVE. THE DETERMINATION SHALL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

4. AN AIR-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILE (ASBM) IS A BALLISTIC MISSILE INSTALLED IN OR ON A BOMBER AND CAPABLE OF RANGES IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS.

5. A MISSILE LAUNCHER IS ANY DEVICE OR EQUIPMENT CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING A MISSILE.

6. A MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLE (MIRV) SYSTEM IS ANY DISPENSING MECHANISM, TOGETHER WITH ITS REENTRY VEHICLES, WHICH IS CAPABLE OF RELEASING TWO OR MORE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES FROM A BALLISTIC MISSILE. REENTRY VEHICLES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE IF BOTH THEIR DOWN-RANGE AND CROSS-RANGE SEPARATIONS AT IMPACT CAN BE CONTROLLED INDEPENDENTLY

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7. AN ICBM, SLBM, OR ASBM EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM IS ANY ICBM, SLBM, OR ASBM WITH A BOOSTER WHICH IS OF A TYPE THAT HAS BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED ONE OR MORE TIMES WITH A MIRV SYSTEM.

8. A HEAVY ICBM IS ANY ICBM WHICH HAS A VOLUME OR THROW-WEIGHT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE LARGEST NON-HEAVY ICBM DEPLOYED BY EITHER PARTY PRIOR TO THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2469

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 0067

ARTICLE III

EXDIS

1. FROM OCTOBER 3, 1977, EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO LIMIT ICBM, SLEM, AND ASBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 2,400. WITHIN THIS LIMITATION AND SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, EACH PARTY WILL BE FREE TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF THE AGGREGATE AMONG ICBM, SLBM, AND ASBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS.

2. (A) THE LIMITATION SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE SHALL APPLY TO:

(1) FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS THAT ARE EITHER OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION;

(2) MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS WHEN SUCH LAUNCHERS ARE FIRST BROUGHT OUT OF THE FINAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY;

(3) SLBM LAUNCHERS WHEN THE SUBMARINE CARRYING SUCH SLBM LAUNCHERS BEGINS SEA TRIALS;

(4) HEAVY BOMBERS WHEN SUCH BOMBERS ARE FIRST BROUGHT OUT OF THE FINAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY;

(5) ASBM LAUNCHERS WHEN A BOMBER EQUIPPED WITH SUCH ALUNCHERS IS FIRST BROUGHT OUT OF THE FINAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY.

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(B) IN ADDITION, THE LIMITATION SET FORTH IN THIS ARTICLE SHALL APPLY TO ICBM, SLBM, AND ASBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS WHICH ARE:

(1) UNDERGOING OVERHAUL, REPAIR, OR CONVERSION;

(2) IN STORAGE OR RESERVE.

3. THE NUMBER OF ASBM LAUNCHERS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION SET FORTH IN THIS ARTICLE FOR EACH BOMBER ON WHICH ASBM LAUNCHERS SUBJECT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF THIS ARTICLE ARE INSTALLED SHALL BE EQUAL TO THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ASBMS WHICH EACH SUCH BOMBER IS CONFIGURED TO CARRY AT ONE TIME AND LAUNCH IN THE COURSE OF ONE MISSION.

4. A HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED ONLY WITH ASBMS SHALL NOT ITSELF BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION SET FORTH IN THIS ARTICLE.

5. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO CONSIDER AS SUBJECT TO THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION SET FORTH IN THIS ARTICLE ALL LAND-MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS COMPATIBLE WITH LAUNCHING AN ICBM.

ARTICLE IV

1. WITHIN THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION SET FORTH IN ARTICLE III, EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO LIMIT LAUNCHERS FOR ICBMS, SLBMX, AND ASBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 1,320

.
WITHIN THIS LIMITATION AND SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, EACH PARTY SHALL BE FREE TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF THE AGGREGATE AMONG ICBM, SLBM, AND ASBM LAUNCHERS.

2. SUBPARAGRAPHS (A)(1), (2), (3), AND (5) AND (B)(1) AND (2) OF PARAGRAPH 2 AND PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 5 OF ARTICLE III ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE AGGREGATE NUMBER SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE.

3. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO CONSIDER ICBMS, SLBMS, AND ASBMS AS SUBJECT TO THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION SET FORTH IN THIS ARTICLE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOL TO THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH PROTOCOL SHALL BE CONSIDERED AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS AGREEMENT.

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ARTICLE V

1. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO START CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS OR TO RELOCATE EXISTING FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS.

2. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO CONVERT LAUNCHERS FOR NON-HEAVY ICBMS, OR FOR ICBMS OF OLDER TYPES DEPLOYED PRIOR TO 1964, INTO LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY ICBMS OF TYPES DEPLOYED AFTER THAT TIME.

3. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO INCREASE THE ORIGINAL LENGTH OR DIAMETER OF ANY ICBM SILO LAUNCHER BY MORE THAN 15 PERCENT. ANY INCREASE SHALL BE LIMITED TO ONE DIMENSION, EITHER LENGTH OR DIAMETER

4. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY AN ICBM HAVING A VOLUME OR THROW-WEIGHT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE LARGEST HEAVY ICBM DEPLOYED BY EITHER PARTY ON THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

5. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO HAVE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT ANY TIME SLBM, MOBILE ICBM, OR ASBM LAUNCHERS OR HEAVY BOMBERS IN EXCESS OF A NUMBER CONSISTENT WITH A NORMAL CONSTRUCTION OR MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT SCHEDULE.

6. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE:

(A) NOT TO SUPPLY ICBM DEPLOYMENT FIELDS, UNITS, OR BASES WITH MORE THAN ONE MISSILE FOR EACH LAUNCHER, PLUS AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF MISSILES CONSISTENT WITH NORMAL MAINTENANCE, TRAINING, AND REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS;

(B) NOT TO PROVIDE STORAGE FACILITIES FOR OR TO STORE ANY ADDITIONAL MISSILES AT ICBM LAUNCH SITES;

(C) NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY ICBM LAUNCHERS WITH RAPID RELOAD CAPABILITIES.

ARTICLE VI

1. THE AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN ARTICLES III AND IV
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SHALL NOT APPLY TO:

(A) ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS USED ONLY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, OR TRAINING;

(B) LAUNCHERS USED ONLY FOR SPACE FLIGHTS.

2. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT:

(A) THERE SHALL BE NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ICBM OR SLBM LAUNCHERS USED ONLY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, OR TRAINING AND LAUNCHERS FOR SPACE FLIGHTS, OR IN THE NUMBER OF SUCH LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY ICBMS;

(B) CONSTRUCTION OR CONVERSION OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AT TEST RANGES SHALL BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY FOR PURPOSES OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, OR TRAINING.

ARTICLE VII

SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MAY BE CARRIED OUT.

ARTICLE VIII

1. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO BEGIN , AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AND IN ANY CASE NO LATER THAN ONE YEAR FOLLOWING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF THE AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLES III AND IV OF THIS AGREEMENT AND ON OTHER LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS, WITH THE OBJECTIVE THAT SUCH REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS SHALL TAKE EFFECT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

2. NO LATER THAN FIVE YEARS PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES SHALL TOGETHER CONDUCT A REVIEW OF THIS AGREEMENT. IT SHALL BE THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PARTIES DURING THE COURSE OF THIS REVIEW TO CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS ON AN AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE UPON THE EXPIRATION OF THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE IX

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MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS WHICH WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION SET FORTH IN ARTICLE III, AS WELL AS MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION SET FORTH IN ARTICLE IV AND MISSILE LAUNCHERS PROHIBITED BY THIS AGREEMENT, SHALL BE DESTROYED OR DISMANTLED PURSUANT TO PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2470

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 0067

EXDIS

1. FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, EACH PARTY SHALL USE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AT ITS DISPOSAL IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

2. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER PARTY, OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE.

3. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES OR TO EMPLOY PRACTICES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. THIS OBLIGATION SHALL NOT REQUIRE CHANGES IN CONSTRUCTION, ASSEMBLY, CONVERSION, OVERHAUL, OR TESTING PRACTICES IN USE PRIOR TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE XI

1. TO PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES SHALL USE THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, SIGNED DECEMBER 21, 1972.

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2. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, WITH RESPECT TO THIS AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES SHALL:

(A) AT THE FIRST SESSION FOLLOWING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, AND TWICE ANNUALLY THEREAFTER, EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON THE NUMBERS BY CATEGORY OF THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITED BY THIS AGREEMENT;

(B) AGREE UPON PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR DESTRUCTION, DISMANTLING, REPLACEMENT, AND CONVERSION, WITH NOTIFICATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN BEING GIVEN TWICE ANNUALLY, OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN CASES PROVIDED FOR BY THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. SUCH NOTIFICATION SHALL INCLUDE ACTIONS COMPLETED IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS, CURRENTLY UNDERWAY, AND TO BE TAKEN OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS;

(C) CONSIDER QUESTIONS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AND RELATED SITUATIONS WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED AMBIGUOUS;

(D) PROVIDE ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS SUCH INFORMATION AS EITHER PARTY CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO ASSURE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED;

(E) CONSIDER QUESTIONS INVOLVING UNINTENDED INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION;

(F) CONSIDER POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT;

(G) CONSIDER, AS APPROPRIATE, POSSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER INCREASING THE VIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT;

(H) CONSIDER, AS APPROPRIATE, PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS;

(I) CONSIDER, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, VERIFICATION ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEMS, INCLUDING NEW TYPES,
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DEPLOYED PURSUANT TO MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT AS PERMITTED BY ARTICLE VII.

ARTICLE XII

EITHER PARTY MAY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THIS AGREEMENT. AGREED AMENDMENTS SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE XIII

EACH PARTY SHALL, IN EXERCISING ITS NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THIS AGREEMENT IF IT DECIDES THAT EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS RELATED TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS AGREEMENT HAVE JEOPARDIZED ITS SUPREME INTERESTS. IT SHALL GIVE NOTICE OF ITS DECISION TO THE OTHER PARTY SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AGREEMENT. SUCH NOTICE SHALL INCLUDE A STATEMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS THE NOTIFYING PARTY REGARDS AS HAVING JEOPARDIZED ITS SUPREME INTERESTS.

ARTICLE XIV

THIS AGREEMENT SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 1985,

UNLESS REPLACED EARLIER BY AN AGREEMENT FURTHER LIMITING STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS.

ARTICLE XV

ENTRY INTO FORCE PROVISIONS TO BE AGREED.

DONE AT.....ON.....IN TWO COPIES, EACH
IN THE ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGES, BOTH TEXTS BEING EQUALLY
AUTHENTIC.

FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
OF AMERICA SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PROTOCOL

TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND

THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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ON THE
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE PARTIES,

HAVING AGREED ON AN AGGREGATE LIMITATION ON LAUNCHERS FOR ICBMS,
SLBMS, AND ASMBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO CONSIDER AS SUBJECT TO THE AGGREGATE
LIMITATION SET FORTH IN ARTICLE IV OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (THE
AGREEMENT);

(A) FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS THE CONSTRUCTION OF WHICH WAS INITIATED
AFTER JULY 1, 1970 AND FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS CONVERTED AFTER JULY 1,
1973, THROUGH CHANGES IN LENGTH OR DIAMETER OR THROUGH OTHER
MODIFICATIONS, SO AS TO PERMIT THE DEPLOYMENT ON SUCH LAUNCHERS OF
MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS;

(B) SLBM LAUNCHERS CONVERTED THROUGH CHANGES IN LENGTH OR
DIAMETER OR THROUGH OTHER MODIFICATIONS, SO AS TO PERMIT THE
DEPLOYMENT ON SUCH LAUNCHERS OF MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRV
SYSTEMS;

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2471

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

(C) SLBM LAUNCHERS ON ALL SUBMARINES OF A GIVEN CLASS IF
A MISSILE EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM HAS BEEN DEPLOYED ON AN
SLBM LAUNCHER ON ANY SUBMARINE OF THE SAME CLASS;
(D) ALL OTHER LAUNCHERS ON WHICH ICBMS, SLBMS, OR ASBMS EQUIPPED
WITH MIRV SYSTEMS ARE DEPLOYED.

2. WITH RESPECT TO THE CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES NOT
EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS TO LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MI
RV
SYSTEMS, THE LIMITATION SET FORTH IN ARTICLE IV OF THE AGREEMENT SHALL
APPLY TO:

(A) FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS WHEN CONVERSION BEGINS;
(B) MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS WHEN SUCH LAUNCHERS ARE
FIRST BROUGHT OUT OF THE CONVERSION FACILITY;
(C) SLBM LAUNCHERS WHEN THE FIRST SUBMARINE OF A CLASS CARRYING
SUCH LAUNCHERS FIRST GOES TO SEA AFTER CONVERSION;
(D) ASBM LAUNCHERS WHEN A BOMBER EQUIPPED WITH SUCH LAUNCHERS
IS FIRST BROUGHT OUT OF THE CONVERSION FACILITY.

3. A MISSILE LAUNCHER SUBJECT TO THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION OF
ARTICLE IV OF THE AGREEMENT SHALL CONTINUE TO BE SUBJECT TO SUCH
LIMITATION UNTIL, PURSUANT TO PROCEDURES AGREED UPON IN THE STANDING
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CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, SUCH LAUNCHER IS DESTROYED OR DISMANTLED OR CONVERTED TO A MISSILE LAUNCHER WHICH IS NOT CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING A MISSILE EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM.

(OTHER AGREED PROVISIONS NECESSARY TO INSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION ON LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS.)

4. THIS PROTOCOL SHALL BE CONSIDERED AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AGREEMENT.

DONE AT ON IN TWO COPIES,
EACH IN THE ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGES, BOTH TEXTS BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC.

FOR THE UNITED STATES	FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
OF AMERICA	SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

III

MR. MINISTER, THE DRAFT TEXT WHICH I HAVE PRESENTED EMBODIES THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AND IS IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK AND RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE INITIALLED ON DECEMBER 10, 1974. I OFFER IT FOR THE CAREFUL STUDY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

UNQUOTE
JOHNSON

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Channel Indicators: n/a
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Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 MAR 1975
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Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
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Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750077-0444
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 13
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <22 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

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Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AND THE U.S. DRAFT TEXT OF MARCH 5, 1975 (SALT TWO - 547)
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006